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ABSTRACT 
This article examines the nature of ownership of land and derivative or subordinate real-
rights under English law drawing some comparison with Romanic-Dutch ownership while arguing 
that the Anglo-American estate’ or interest’ in land is a mere semantic conundrum.  It is the 
position of this writer that the concept of ownership in English law of real property, which 
dominantly influences our real property law in Nigeria and other common law jurisdictions such as 
the Bahamas and Jamaica, has not brought the desirable clarity to our real property 
jurisprudence/practice in Nigeria. The unfortunate problems faced by purchasers of real estate in 
some common law jurisdiction are also briefly examined in this article. The article seeks to advance a 
solution to these problems and in this context the writer strongly suggests that a land registration 
system of some model should be adopted in Nigeria and the Bahamas to protect purchasers of real 
estates and guarantee greater security of title and clarity in our conveyancing practice. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Land is elemental. It is where life begins and it is where life ends. Land provides the 
physical substratum for human activity; it is the essential base of all social and 
commercial interaction. Land law is, accordingly, that part of the law which governs 
the allocation of rights and obligations in relation to ‘real’ or ‘immovable’ property. 
We spend scarcely a moment out of contact with terra firma and our very existence 
is constantly sustained and shaped by the natural and constructed world around us. 
The significance of land in human affairs is therefore incalculable, although it is only 
in an era of global environmental threat that we slowly begin to realize how fragile 
and irreplaceable the rich resource on which we so utterly depend is. In the case of 
real property, as was once observed, ‘there is a defined and limited supply of the 
commodity.’1 Land ownership bites both upon two concepts or forms of ownership 
i.e. the principal or dominant right and ownership of third party rights which are 
commonly known as subordinate real rights: X owns land for instance, but others 
may have rights in that land for land is an asset that lots of people can do lots of 
things with. We can live on it, build on it, work over it, catch fish in river or on it, 
play on it, and trade both on it and in it.2  
Moreover, land is said to be static or stationary in the sense that it stays 
where it is, unlike say ships and other moveable items.3   At any given time a 
multitude of interests and rights can exists in one and the same land.  More than 
anything else, the fact of the possibility of existence of multiplicity of interests and 
rights in land spins a serious conundrum in dealing with land ownership and 
prospective purchasers are usually faced with potential problems where issues are not 
                                                
* Solicitor of England and Wales, Chigbo is a Peripatetic Lecturer in Law in the UK, the Bahamas and 
Nigeria. He is presently with the College of Law, Afe Babalola University, Ado-Ekiti, Nigeria. 
1 Linden Gardens Trust Ltd v Lenesta Sludge Disposals Ltd (1994) 1 AC 85 at 107D per Lord 
Brown-Wilkinson. 
2 See Qualified Lawyers Transfer Test 2007, Property Manual, BPP  Professional Education 2007, 
London, England, p  1-5 
3 These items are classified as personal property in contradistinction to land that is classified as real 
property. 
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handled with desirable expertise from a conveyancing perspective. Thus, the 
ownership of a land under English law is complex, and a potentially infinite number 
of people may have rights in it.  That complexity militates against easy transactions in 
land. It may make it difficult to know at any given point in time who owns a piece of 
land or how many people have rights in it, or which third party rights have priority 
over other third party rights in a given land.  When we view this from the context of 
legal terminology, the picture appears to be like a diptych for the reason that Western 
Legal systems have organized that intricacy in two different ways.  
There are the common law systems, based on English law, and the civil law 
systems, descended from Roman law, and they take two quite distinct approaches to 
the ownership of land. For instance, in civil law systems, there is one owner of land, 
while others may have subordinate rights in it; in the common law on the other 
hand, ownership is not a unitary concept, and it may be impossible to say that any 
person is” the owner “ of a piece of land. A veritable example is where land may be 
held upon trust, owned by one person for the benefit of someone else, and in this 
regard, we can rightly say that both the trustees and the beneficiary have ownership 
rights in the land, the one legal and the other equitable.4 In the common law, 
ownership   is not a unitary concept, and it may be impossible to ascertain with 
pellucid clarity the owner of the entirety or totality of rights that inhere in a given 
property as right in the land may reside in multiple parties and thus the concept of 
absolute or full ownership becomes illusory in English law. In actuality under the 
English common law of real property there is always this dualistic approach to 
ownership of interest or estate in land, the one legal and the other equitable.5  Third 
party rights too inexorably follow the same principle in that they may be either legal 
or equitable and this sets up difficult questions or conundrum of priority and a 
purchaser is morbidly concerned about all these intricacies and complexities of 
English land law.6 In 1974, John Henry Merryman explained the difference between 
the two legal families like this: 
The basic difference between Romanic ownership and the Anglo-American 
‘estate’ or ‘interest’ in land can be illustrated by a simple metaphor. Romanic 
ownership can be thought of as a box, with the word ‘ownership’ written on 
it. Whoever has the box is the ‘owner’. In the case of complete, 
unencumbered ownership, the box contains certain rights, including that of 
use and occupancy, that to the fruits of income, and the power of alienation. 
The owner can, however, open the box and remove one or more such rights 
and transfer them to others. But, as long as he keeps the box, he still has the 
ownership, even if the box is empty. The contrast with the Anglo-American 
law of property is simple. There is no box. There are merely various sets of 
legal interests. One who has the fee simple absolute has the largest possible 
                                                
4 Note that the trust concept runs through the entire gamut of English law of property especially in 
the context of co-ownership. Whenever two or more persons have an interest in land a trust situation 
will arise. See J E Penner, The Law of Trust, 5th ed., oxford university press, 2006, pp 10-13. 
5 The rigorous distinction drawn in the 1925 legislation between legal and equitable rights becomes 
more readily explicable when it is realized that the borderline between legal and equitable quality has 
provided, at least in historical terms, an important key to the resolution of the central question of land 
law. This central issue concerns whether subsidiary entitlements or derivative real rights of various 
kinds survive a disposition of the land to which they relate, thereby remaining valid and enforceable 
against a purchaser. This concern demands visceral scrutiny and appreciation by land law lawyers in 
the context of any given factual conveyancing matrix so as to accord greater circumspection to the 
protection of the interest of the purchaser. 
6 See the case of William and Glyn’s Bank Ltd v Boland (1981) A C 487.   
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bundle of such sets of legal interests. When he conveys one or more of them 
to another person, a part of his bundle is gone.7 
 
The construction of a coherent legal regime for land has not been a simple or 
instant process. Indeed, it is not easy to imagine, tabula rasa, how best to fashion a 
systematic body of rules governing rights in and over land.8 The conceptual point of 
crucial significance which lies at the back of the English law of land is the axiomatic 
construct that ownership of land does not exist and it still remains true that the law 
as it is today is still heavily impressed with the form of legal and intellectual 
constructs as mentioned above.  English law has never contemplated with 
equanimity the idea of full ownership in the landowner. The world of the common 
lawyer has always been a curious blend of the physical and the abstract, a co-mixture 
or a collocation of the earthily pragmatic and the deeply conceptual.9  Having broken 
away from the Romanist legal tradition, the common lawyer devised a distinctive 
regime of property rules which – notwithstanding the extensive statutory 
consolidation of the early 20th century – is still piecemeal and full of internal 
ambivalence. The alternative to the dominium of civilian jurisprudence remains a 
collocation of organic adaptations, the common lawyer’s crudely empirical outlook 
being encapsulated in a general reluctance to embrace any grand or over-arching 
model of the phenomenon of ownership.10 In consequence, the common lawyer’s 
understanding of land still oscillates between a purely material conception of the 
physical stuff of land and a more cerebral image of land comprising a co-ordinate set 
of abstract rights. This tension between the empirical and the conceptual is 
indispensable to understanding the nature of land ownership under the English law.  
At one level, the common lawyer’s primary concern is with the observable 
phenomenon of de facto possessory control as exercised over physically identifiable 
terrain or premises. What actually happens on the ground – whether rightly or 
wrongly – has always constituted a powerful determination of entitlement in English 
land law. The normative tug of sheer physical fact should never be underestimated. 
Yet, at another level, the common law perception of property embodies an obsession 
with the rational manipulation of abstract concepts and with the careful outworking 
of axiomatic truths. Nowhere is this fascination with the naked force of reason more 
apparent than in the law of land, with its remorseless taxonomy of estates and 
interests,11 its sub-classification of legal and equitable rights,12 and with its multiple 
                                                
7 JH Merryman, ‘Ownership and Estate’, (1974) 48 Tulane Law Review 916, at 927; cited in S Panesar, 
General Principles of Property Law (London, Longman, 2001) at 113. it should be noted further that 
under English law land was held in a pyramidal relationship of reciprocal obligation. 
8 See Kevin Gray and Susan Francis Gray, Elements of Land Law, 4th Ed., Oxford University Press, 
2005, pp 1-4. 
9 For a discussion of the tension between these various elements, see Gray and Gray, ‘The idea of 
Property in Land’, in S Bright and J K Dewar (Ed), Land Law; Themes and Perspectives (OUP 1998), 
pp 18-39. 
10 See e.g. Commissioner for Railways et al v Valuer-General (1974) AC 328 at 351H-352A per Lord 
Wilberforce. Compare the dominium of Roman law, which treated as conceptually inseparable the 
owner’s right to use, dispose of, and exclude others from his property with the English common law 
position. Dominium was an indivisible unity and the idea that it might be fragmented between a 
number of owners, each with a separate proprietary right to different aspects of dominium, was and 
still is unacceptable to civilian legal thought. See also Gray and Gray op cit at p 6. 
11 The doctrine of estate has its origin in the medieval theory of English land which was introduced 
after the Norman invasion of and conquest of 1066. By virtue of an act of conquest the King acquired 
an ultimate or ‘radical’ title to all land in England. The manifestation of the King’s power in this 
regard lay in the political authority of the crown both to grant interests in the land to be held of the 
crown and also to prescribe the residue of unalienated land as the sovereign’s beneficial interests. It 
4 Chigbo: The Nature of Land Ownership and the Protection of the Purchaser 
 
applications of propositional dogma.13. In the hands of the common lawyer, land law 
became a field of highly artificial concepts, each defined with meticulous – almost 
mathematical – precision.14 The idea of land and its relation to man has always been 
viewed in the form of being recognized only in the nature of being estates, interests 
and entitlements and this has led to the introduction of a theory of notional estates 
in land and not ownership of land in any sense of the word. English law recognizes 
only the ownership of abstract ‘estates’ rather than any ownership of land itself.15 
Property in land is necessarily articulated through the medium of notional ‘estates’ in 
realty. 16 It was, however, the characteristic interplay of empirical and conceptual 
concerns which has made modern law what it is, although the interaction has also 
served to infuse land law with a structural ambiguity which goes to the root of even 
the definition of such terms as ‘land’ itself.17 The common lawyer has no intellectual 
predisposition to propound large abstract declarations of ownership and has never 
done so in relation to ‘land’, but relies instead upon substantial reserves of common 
sense as applied, on a case-specific basis, to the raw facts of human behavior. It is in 
this regard that possession assumes a more preeminent dimension in the estimation 
of common law in dealing with the issue of ‘land’.18 The underlying tension between 
                                                                                                                                
follows that the King’s subjects – be they ever so great – occupied their lands on the terms of some 
grant derived ultimately from the largesse of the crown. It was in this regard that what the medieval 
tenant could say he ‘owned’ came to be referred to as estate. See Gray and Gray, Elements of Land 
Law,  op cit pp 60-65. 
12 Within the field of proprietary rights in land, English law still draws a fundamental distinction 
between legal and equitable rights. Historically this distinction was grounded on the fact that legal 
rights were enforceable only in the common law courts of the King, whereas equitable rights fell 
within the exclusive and conscience-based jurisdiction, initially of the King’s Chancellor, and later of 
the Court of Chancery. See Pollock and Maitland, The History of English Law, (2nd edn, London 
1968), Vol 1, pp 193-197. 
13 In this way the austere propositional logic of unregistered land law demands that purchasers of land 
(and, indeed, all others) take unregistered estates subject to such pre-existing rights as legal easements, 
legal terms of years, legal mortgages and legal rights of entry. Note that the term ‘purchaser’ includes a 
mortgagee 
14 See Wright v Gibbons (1949) 70 CLR 313 at 330 per Dixon J (confirming that central features of 
modern property law bear ‘many traces of the scholasticism of the times in which its principles were 
developed’). 
15 The common law to a large extent has not found it necessary to construct any large or systematic 
theory of ownership. See Gray, ‘Property in Common Law Systems, in G E Van Maanen and A J Van 
der Walt (ed), Property Law on the Threshold of the 21st Century (MAKLU, Antwerp, 1996), pp 277-
278.  In contradistinction to the Romanic-Dutch legal system that emphasizes on dominion in relation 
to property right, it appears that the conceptual purity of a regime of individually ordered estates and 
interests in land under English law seemed to provide a perfectly functional substitute for more 
holistic ideas of dominium under the Romanic-Dutch system. 
16 See Reilly v Booth (1890) 44 CH D 12 at 22-23 per Cotton L J, 26 per Lopes LJ. 
17 More than two centuries ago Blackstone declared ‘land’ to be a word of ‘a very extensive 
signification’. See Bl Comm, Vol 11, p 16. It has been further suggested in relation to land that 
something of its amplitude is captured in a number of statutory definitions which, although not 
uniform or consistent, point to ‘land’ as having a fairly complex meaning in English law. For instance, 
the law of property Act 1925, the primary statute contained within the corpus of English legislation 
1925, describes ‘land’ as including land of any tenure, and mines and minerals, whether or not held 
apart from the surface, buildings or parts of buildings whether the division is horizontal, vertical or 
made in any other way) and other corporeal hereditaments; also a manor, an advowson, and a rent 
and other incorporeal hereditaments, and an easement, right, privilege, or benefit in, over, or derived 
from land…See Law of Property Act 1925, s 205(1)(ix). 
18 The common law theory of relativity of title therefore predicated that the best ‘title’ was that of the 
person whose claim to ‘possession’ was superior to that of anyone else. Since the best possible ‘title’ 
flows from ownership of the largest common law ‘estates’, unchallenged defacto ‘possession’ of land 
is equated with, and legally generates, ownership of an ‘estate’ in fee simple. Possession therefore is 
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the material and the conceptual has imparted a multi-dimensional complexity to the 
understanding of the term ‘land’ in English law. 19. The first three dimension of land 
as a physical reality are perfectly consistent with the rough and ready empiricism 
which characterizes so much of English land law and our land law in Nigeria and the 
land law of other common law jurisdictions like the Bahamas and the Jamaica as 
well. The common law has also given a chronological significance to the raw and 
pragmatic notion of possession. The phenomenon of ‘property’ in land is simply a 
product of behavioral reality or socially constituted fact. It is indeed, at this point 
that it becomes mostly clearly apparent that effective possession comprises the basis 
of most claims of ‘property’ in land and, in the process, introduced the 
transformative concept of time-related ‘estates’ in the land. 20 The idea of land has 
taken a more cerebral dimension with the introduction of a theory of notional estates 
in land. In effect, English law invented an entire intellectual apparatus of artificial 
constructs in order to explain various forms of entitlement to land.  
The idea of ownership can be seen to be effectively discountenanced by 
English law in that the devise of the ‘estates’ in land articulated the jural relationship 
between the land holder (i.e. the ‘tenant’) and his land who under the doctrine of 
subinfeudation is indeed a tenant to the original and primary land owner (i.e. the 
King/Queen) in whom all the ownership of land is vested. The inspired evolution of 
the ‘estate’ came eventually to provide a functional alternative to the holistic idea of 
dominium (or direct ownership of the land itself), which was part of the European 
heritage derived from Roman law. 21 Indeed, perhaps, the single most striking feature 
of English law is the absence, within its conceptual scheme, of any over-arching 
notion of ownership.22 And it is in the distinctively English doctrines relating to 
estates and tenures that the roots of modern land law are to be located. Whereas the 
doctrine of tenures veritably served to describe the relationship existing between a 
tenant and his lord, it was the doctrine of estates, which mediated the relationship 
between the tenant and the land. The latter doctrine still plays a fundamental role in 
the classification or taxonomy of interests in land. 
 
THE DOCTRINE OF ESTATES 
The origins of the medieval theory of English land law lay in the Norman 
invasion of 1066. By virtue of an act of conquest the King acquired an ultimate or 
‘radical’ title to all land in England.23 This radical title was simply ‘concomitant of 
                                                                                                                                
prima facie evidence of seisin in fee simple. Peaceable de Uncle v Watson (1811) 4 Taunt 16 at 17, 128 
ER .232 per Mansfield CJ; See also Re Atkinson and Horsell’s Contract (1972) 2 Ch 1 at 9 per 
Cozens-Hardy MR. 
19 This veritably demonstrates the ultimate collocation/integration of the material and the conceptual 
in context 
20 See e.g. National Carriers Ltd v Panalpina (Northern) Ltd (1981) AC 675 at 708C, where Lord 
Rusesel of Killowen noted that a grant of an estate in fee simple passes the land ‘as to its surface, and 
below its surface, and the airspace above, subject to exclusions. The three-dimensional nature of land 
is more eloquently than accurately expressed in the Latin maxim, cuius est solum eius est usque ad 
coelum et ad inferos; i.e. he who owns the land owns everything reaching up to the very heavens and 
down to the depths of the earth. 
21 Following Roman law, the great codes of civilian law still define ‘proprietary’ in terms of  the right 
to enjoy a thing and to dispose of it in the most absolute manner (see e.g. Code civil, art 544; 
Burgerliches Gesetzbach, para 903; Swiss Civil Code, art 641). 
22 See generally A W B Simpson, A History of the Land Law (2nd edn, London 1981). 
23 Mabo v Queensland (No 2) (1993) 175 CLR 1 at 48 per Brennan J, 80 per Deane and Gaudron JJ. 
(The Mabo case, involving the land rights of the Meriam people of the Murray Islands, provided an 
unusual – indeed almost unprecedented – forum for the critical examination in the High Court of 
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sovereignty’ – a brute emanation of territorial power acquired and sustained through 
physical force.24  It denoted the political authority of the crown both to grant 
interests in the land to be held of the crown and also to prescribe the residue of 
unalienated land as the sovereign’s beneficial interest.25 It followed that the king’s 
subjects – be they ever so great – occupied their lands on the terms of some grant 
derived ultimately from the largesse of the crown. It was not initially clear what (if 
anything at all) the individual tenant could say he ‘owned’, but an answer was 
eventually found in the doctrine of estates. 
The doctrine of estates carefully avoided the absolutist dogma that a person 
could have any direct relation of ownership with physical land.  It is fundamental of 
English land law that nobody except the Crown owns any land.26 At the heart of 
medieval theory lay the proposition that there could be no ownership of land, as 
such, outside the allodium – or prerogatival title – of the crown. The object of each 
tenant’s ownership was instead an artificial proprietary construct called an estate.27 
The notional entity of the estate was interposed between the tenant and the lands 
with the consequence that each tenant owned (and still owns) not land itself but an 
estate in land.28 Each estate being graded with reference to its temporal duration. 
Estate in this context is merely viewed as slices of time. The duration of estates gave 
expression to the idea that each landholder owned not land but a slice of time in the 
land.  
As was argued elegantly in Washington’s case,29  
…the land itself is one thing, and the estate in the land  is another thing, for 
an estate in the land is a time in the land, or land for a time, and there are 
diversities of estates, which are no more than diversities of time…By 
identifying a number of conceptual ‘estates’ as potential objects of 
ownership, the doctrine of estates effectively quantified the abstract 
entitlement which might be enjoyed by any particular tenant within the 
tenurial framework. The careful calibration of these estates injected a crucial 
dimension of time into the phenomenon of landholding, each estate 
comprising a time-related segment – a temporal slice of the rights and 
powers exercisable over land. As Pollock and Maitland so aptly put it, the 
doctrine of estate enabled proprietary rights in land to be ‘projected upon the 
plain of time.30  
                                                                                                                                
Australia of the most fundamental concepts of English land law.) See also Las Kiv’ Alaams Band of 
Indians v Hudson’s Bay Co (1998) 158 DLR (4th) 526 at 535. 
24 ‘Radical title links international and constitutional law notions with those which supports the private 
law of proprietary rights and interests in land’ (Wik Peoples v Queensland (1996) 187 CLR 1 at 186 
per Gummow J) For reference to the uncannily parallel notions of state sovereignty and private 
property, see Gray, (1991) CLJ 252 at 304; ‘The Ambivalence of Property’, in Prins (ed), Threats 
without Enemies (Earthscan Publications 1993), p 169. 
25 Mabo v Queensland (No 2) (1993) 175 CLR 1 at 48 per Brennan J.   
26 See Lowe v J W Ashmore Ltd (1971) Ch 545 at 554F per Megarry J.   
27 In English law no subject can own land allodially – he can own only an estate in land (Minister of 
State for the Army v Dulziel  (1944) 68 CLR 261 at 277 per Lotham CJ). See also Stokes v Costain 
Property Investments Ltd (1963) 1 WLR 907 at 909E-F. 
28 See Lowe v J W Ashmore Ltd (1971) Ch 545 at 554F per Megarry J. 
29 (1573) 2 Plowd 547 at 555, 75 ER 805 at 816-817 
30 The substitution of an abstract estate in land (in place of land itself) as the object of proprietary 
right has had the most profound influence on English law. The ingenious compromise of the doctrine 
of estates resolved at a stroke the apparent contradiction between theory and reality in the ownership 
of land. At one level the ‘estate’ in the land merely demarcated the temporal extent of the grant to a 
tenant within the vertical power structure emanating from the crown. In practice the conceptualism of 




THE THEORY OF TENURE AND THE MODERN IMPACT OF THE 
DOCTRINE OF ESTATES  
The old common law estates were preserved, with modifications and 
additions, in the property legislations of 1925.31 It can even be argued that the 
scheme of landholding in Nigeria now contained in the Land Use Act 1978 is 
actually premised on the intellectual construct of the estate.32 Note the nature of the 
interest which the Act of 1978 confers on the proprietor or grantee. Modern English 
property legislation thus faithfully maintains the ancient theory that land ownership 
and use are mediated, not by the attribution to individuals of any direct ownership of 
the dominium over the land itself, but rather by the distribution of intangible jural 
entitlements which are interposed between persons and land.33In this respect at least, 
the perspective embraced by the statutory scheme is essentially, of property as an 
abstract right rather than as a physical resource, precisely on the footing that the only 
property in land which one can have is necessarily property in the form of a right. 
However, it should be acutely noted that ‘property’ in land is not an emanation of 
socially constituted fact, but rather comprises various assortments of artificially jural 
rights.34 This vision of property as a right rests upon a complex calculus of carefully 
calibrated estates and interests in land, all underpinned by the political theory implicit 
in the doctrine of tenure.35 In this sense, all property relationships with land are, 
accordingly, analysed through the intermediacy of artificial conceptual abstractions.36  
No citizen can claim that he or she owns the physical solum. One has ‘property’ in 
the form of an abstract right rather than ‘property’ in a physical thing. Each right is a 
                                                                                                                                
about the wider phenomenon of ownership. Indeed, it was the concentration on the rights and 
powers appertaining to different kinds of ‘estate’ which so sharply distinguished the common view of 
real property from the continental emphasis on full ownership in the sense of dominium. It was Otto 
Kahn-Freund who pointed out that owing to its habit of looking at the powers and right arising from 
ownership rather than at ownership in the abstract, English law has been able to introduce the time 
element into the property concept. The continental notion of property, like the dominium of Roman 
law, contains, as a matter of principle, element of eternity’   (‘Introduction’  to Karl Renner, The 
Institutions of Private Law and Their Social Function (London and Boston 1949), p 23). Consonantly 
with the feudal theory of ultimate sovereign title, some form of abstract estates constitutes the 
maximum interest which any subject -we should nowadays say any citizen - may ever hold in respect 
of land. As proprietary relationships with land thus fall to be analysed at a given instance – through 
the intermediacy of an estate – the tenant always having ownership of an intangible right (i.e. an 
estate) rather than ownership of a tangible thing (i.e. the land). At this point the law of real property 
becomes distanced from the physical reality of land and enters a world of considerable conceptual 
abstraction. But in the process the doctrine of estates effectively provides an invaluable means by 
which the three-dimensional phenomenon of realty can be carved up in a fourth dimension of time. 
See Newlorn Housing Trust v Alsulaimen (1999)  1 AC 313 at 317C-D per Lord Hoffmann; Frazer v 
Canterbury Dioceasan Board of Finance (2001) Ch 889 at (42) per Mummery LJ. 
 
31 The 1925 trilogy of legislations i.e. The law of property Act 1925, the Settled land Act 1925 and the 
Land Registration Act 1925 fundamentally or radically altered the entire landscape of English Real 
Property Jurisprudence. 
32 The 1978 Land Use Act vests the ownership of all Lands in Nigeria/ various state of the federation 
in the Federal / state Government and in this regard it can as well be said that nobody owns land in 
Nigeria as all land in the State are vested in the state Government and the state governor is deemed to 
be the chief or principal trustee of all land in the state-See Section 1 of the land Use Act 1990 CAP L5 
L.F.N 2004. 
33 Refer to the Nigerian Land Use Act 1978 
34 Western Australia v. Ward (2000) 170 ALR 159 at 165 per Beaumont and Doussa JJ 
35 See Western Australia v. Ward (2000) 170 ALR per North J. See p 145. 
36 In this sense, as Laskin J once said, ‘’all legal interests are incorporeal’’ (Saskatchewan Minerals v. 
Keyes (19720 23 DLR. (3d) 573 at 586). 
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prepackaged bundle of tightly defined entitlement, the precise content of the bundle 
on the right involved.37  
It follows from the pre-eminence of the estate concept as the vehicle of 
modern land ownership that little now remains of the medieval theory of tenure. 
Tenure is already to some extent, a fiction in England. 38 Under tenural system of 
tiered or hierarchical landholding, all land in England (save unalienated crown land) 
was held, in pyramidal relationships of reciprocal obligations, either mediately or 
immediately of the crown. Whereas the concept of the estate systematized the 
relationship between tenant and the physical land, the concept of tenure 
characterized more closely the relationship between tenant and lord.39  It being 
implicit in the relationship of tenure but both lord and tenant have an interest in the 
land.40 Under the original feudal principle the lord seised his tenant of his tenement41.  
Unless the tenant failed in his service, the lord owed him enjoyment of his tenement 
as long as he lived.42 The different methods of landholding (differentiated according 
to the form of service required) were known as ‘’tenure’’, each indicating the precise 
basis on which the land was held. Pollock and Maitland described the system of 
tenures in terms of series of ‘’feudal ladders’’, noting that theoretically there is no 
limit to the possible numbers of rungs, and … men have enjoyed a larger power, not 
merely of adding new rungs to the bottom of the ladder, but of inserting new rungs 
in the middle of it. In one of the authentic examples provided by Pollock and 
Maitland, it could be said that in Edwards 1st day, Roger of St German holds land at 
Paxton in Huntingdonshire of Robert of Bedford, who holds of Richard of Ilchester, 
who holds of Allan of Chartres, who holds of William le Boteler, who holds of 
Gilbert Nerville, who holds of Devorguil Balliol, who holds of the King of Scotland, 
who holds of the King of England.43  
The process of potentially infinite extension of the feudal ladder was known 
as subinfeudation. This is the process of parceling out land from the King as 
represented by the Crown as the owner of all the land in the country to his subjects 
as tenants in a hierarchical or pyramidal order from the top to the bottom who held 
the land in return for services etc. Subinfeudation has now been replaced by 
substitution to ensure more easy and free transfer of land in a modern society but the 
principle that the Crown owns all the land in England following the Norman 
conquest in 1066, and that the ownership of all land in England and Wales became 
vested in the Crown, in theory, has continued up to the present time.  
The most any other person may own is a right of temporary possession or 
use of land. Other than the technical ownership of the Crown, the highest 
proprietary right anyone can hold is a right to possession of the land for a 
period of time, with or without attached conditions. Such a proprietary right 
to possess the land for a period of time is known as an ‘estate’ in land. Which 
particular estate you hold tells you for how long you hold the right to 
possession of the land. There are only two forms of land ownership capable 
                                                
37 Property in relation to land is a bundle of rights exercisable with respect to the land. (Minister of 
State for the Army v. Dulziel (1944) 68 CLR 261 at 285 per Rich J.) . See also Western Australia v. 
Ward (2000) 170 ALR 159 at (97) per Beaumont and von Doussa JJ. On this view the conceptual or 
cerebrial aspect of ‘property’ in land takes over from the factual or pragmatic.  
38 See Wik v. Peoples v.Queensland (1996)187 CLR 1 at 244 per Kirby J. 
39 Attorney-General of Ontario v Mercer (1883) 8 App Cas 767 at 771-772 per Earl of  Selbourne LC. 
40 Mabo v Queensland (No 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1 at 46 per Breeman J. 
41 On the concept of seism, see para 3.5, chapter 3 of Gray. 
42 In this context, as Toby Milson op.cit, at p 40 has memorably pointed out, ‘to seise is as much a 
transitive verb as to desseise’. Protection was the correlative of fealty. 
43 See Pollock and Maitland, The History of English Law (2nd edn, London 1968) Vol 1, p. 233. 
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of existing as legal estates; the freehold (known technically as the fee simple 
absolute in possession); and the leasehold (known technically as the term of 
years absolute). However subinfeudation carried the disadvantage that it 
tended to make the feudal ladder long and cumbersome, and in time the 
process of alienating land by substitution became more common. Under the 
latter device the alienee of land simply assumed the rung on the feudal ladder 
previously occupied by the alienor, and the creation of a new and inferior 
rung was no longer necessary. It later transpired that by the end of the 13th 
century a new concept of land as a freely alienable asset was beginning to 
displace the restrictive feudal order, and this evolution culminated in the 
enactment of Quia Emptores Act in 1290. This all-important statute 
constituted a pre-eminent expression of a new preference for freedom of 
alienation as a principle of public policy. The major innovation contained in 
the statute was the prohibition for the future of alienation by 
subinfeudation.44 Following the enactment of 1290 Act only the Crown could 
grant new tenure and the existing network of tenures could only contract 
with the passage of time. Every conveyance of land thenceforth had the 
effect of substituting the grantee in the tenural position formerly occupied by 
his grantor; no new relationship of lord and tenant was created by the 
transfer; Note however that it is the Statute Quia Emptores which – quite 
unnoticed – still regulates fee simple transfer of land today.45  
 
In that regard it can be said that in some extremely notional sense, therefore, 
every parcel of land in England and Wales is held of some lord – almost invariably 
the crown. It is still technically the case that the crown holds the ultimate or radical 
title in all land; that no citizen can own land allodially; and that all occupiers of land 
are merely – in the feudal sense – ‘tenants’. Each transfer nowadays is merely a process of 
substitution of the transferee or grantee in the shoes of the transferor or grantor. 
The operation of the statute Quia Emptores during the last seven centuries has 
tended towards a gradual leveling of the feudal pyramid so that all tenants in fee 
simple are today presumed (in the absence of contrary evidence) to hold directly of 
the crown46 Thus, against the background of the foregoing, then, the highest possible 
estate in land under English law is a freehold estate which to all intents and purpose 
nearly corresponds to ownership of land in the lay man’s parlance.  This greatest of 
estates one can have under English land law is technically known as the fee simple 
absolute in possession.  For the purpose of this article, this writer will simply refer to 
a fee simple absolute in possession as “free hold” and this is, in a given real estate 
transaction, what is usually transferred or conveyed to a purchaser who is acquiring 
the highest dominant estate in land albeit that the ownership of the subject land in 
the layman’s parlance is seemingly vested in the purchaser. The purchaser after the 
disposition is said to be ‘seised’ or ‘possessed’ of an estate in fee simple absolute in 
possession. The significance of the doctrine of seisin is not lost to the reader. The 
common law notion of title is founded essentially on the raw fact of unchallenged 
possession.47 Although a central notion in English law, the term ‘possession’ has long 
                                                
44 Substitution replaced subinfeudation in this regard.  
45 It should be acutely noted that Quia Emptores remains effective in many parts of the common law 
world (see e.g. Imperial Acts Application Act 1969 (New South Wales), s 36; Property Law Act 1974 
(Queensland, Australia), s 21). See also Bruce Ziff, Principles of Property Law (3rd edn, Carswell, 
Ontario 2000), pp 55-60.. 
46 or in the context of Nigeria via our Land Use Act 1978, as  the state ‘’tenant in chief’’. 
47 The Seisin – possession concept  
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lacked any concise explication.48 The concept of ‘seisin’ is deeply embedded in the 
historical development of the English law.49 The notion of seisin reflects the 
empirical orientation of the early common, which tended to analyse entitlement to 
land in terms of factual possession rather than in terms of some abstract or 
documentary title.    
For all practical purposes, the owner of a freehold piece of land is equivalent 
to the owner of any other property in practice; it is usually perpetual, but if the 
current freeholder dies without next of kin and without a will, the land reverts to the 
crown. This is technically referred to as Escheat. 
The owner of the freehold, since it is a form of property, is free to sell it or give it 
away.   Alternatively, the owner may grant a lesser estate (one for a shorter period of 
possession) than his own to which that property will then be subject.  Thus, when a 
freehold owner (or more appropriately called the owner of an estate in fee simple) 
grants a lesser estate which is of a certain duration, the estate granted is ’leasehold’ or 
simply a ‘lease’. (i.e. a term of years). The residue of a freehold owner’s estate after 
the granting of a lease is known as the ‘freehold reversion’. At the termination of the 
lease, possession of the land will automatically revert back to the freeholder. 
However, one will note that Merryman’s metaphor as previously mentioned of the 
black box of ownership conveys the idea that in a civil law (Romanic- Dutch) system 
in answer to the question “who owns the house’? It is supposed to be possible to 
point to one individual who is unambiguously the owner, while others may have 
rights of a different kind. He offers no metaphor for common law ownership, where 
there is no black box; one might compare something like a pack of cards, which has 
been dealt among a number of players. For that to work the pack has to contain an 
infinite number of cards; better perhaps would be a strudel or other flaky pastry 
construct, or a chocolate flake bar, where the texture is visibly complex, the 
substance splittable and sharable and the layers quite genuinely uncountable.50 
  It can be argued that ownership under the Roman Dutch system is generally 
inimical to fragmentation which sharply contrasts with the position under the 
common law system which favors a multiplicity of interests in one and the same land 
at the same time and with its characteristic non-recognition of the concept of 
ownership and under which ownership is not a unitary concept and in this regard it 
may be impossible to say that any person is “the owner” of a piece of land.  
Adewale Taiwo in his book ‘The Nigerian Land Law’51   observes that two practical 
difficulties present themselves on the concept of ownership.   First, that the English 
law has never applied the concept of ownership to land.52 Secondly, that ownership 
“is a word of many meanings”.53    
                                                
48 See United v Dolfus Mieg et Cie SA and Bank of England (1952) AC 582 at 605 per Earl Jouritt. 
(Possession is no simple concept). See Mabo v Queensland No 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1 at 207 per 
Toohey J. 
49 See F W Maitland, ‘’The Mystery of Seisin’’ (1886) 2 LQR 481; The Beatitude of Seisin’ (1888) 4 
LQR 249, 286. 
50 Merryman’s point is discussed further by Elizabeth Cooke in “The English Land Registration Act 
2002 and The Nature of Ownership’ Chap 5 of A Hudison (Ed.), New Perspective in Property Law: 
Obligations and Restitution (London, Cavendish, 2003), 117. 
51  E.A Taiwo, the Nigerian land law, Ababa press, Ibadan (2011)   p.10. 
52 Under English law, all titles to land are ultimately based upon possession in the sense that the title 
of the man seised prevails against all who can show no better right to Seisin. As Burns puts it, ‘’Seisin 
is a root of title, and it may be said without undue exaggeration that so far as land is concerned there 
is in England no law of ownership, but only a law of possession. See Burns E H, Cheshire’s Modern 
Law of Real Property 12th ed, (Butterworths, London, 1976), 136. 
53 Burn op cit, 136-137 
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However, according to E. A Taiwo in the present context, ownership 
signifies “a title to a subject- matter whether moveable or immovable that is good 
against the whole world.  In case of land law, ownership, according to the learned 
author signifies the maximum (absolute) right or interest that exists on land and this 
is what is referred to as fee simple absolute in possession or free hold estate under 
English law.54  It should be noted that when a freehold owner grants a lesser estate 
which is of a certain or fixed or determinable duration, the estate granted is leasehold 
or simply a “lease”.   The residue of the freehold owner’s estate after the granting of a 
lease is known as the leasehold reversion.  Usually, at the termination of the lease, 
possession of the land will automatically revert back to the freeholder.   
Indeed, the leaseholder may himself grant a lease (of a lesser duration) out of 
his own estate, whilst still retaining his own original lease (albeit now subject to the 
sub-lease “or under lease “).  For the duration of the sub-lease, the original 
leaseholder holds a “lease hold reversion”, which is also a recognized interest, or 
more appropriately, estate in land and where a lessee transfers his leasehold interest 
to another it is commonly referred to as assignment. 
The process may continue with sub-leases for shorter and shorter periods of 
possession being granted by the successive “sub -leases”.   It should now be apparent 
that any piece of land may be subject to a hierarchy of rights of possession55  with 
the holder of each right owning not the land itself, but rather the right to possession 
of the land, subject to the lesser rights he has been granted for his particular “slice of 
time”. Again, it can be seen from the foregoing that the ownership of land under 
English law is complex, and a potentially infinite number of people may have rights 
in it.   That complexity and the resultant conundrum militate against easy transaction 
in land; it may make it difficult to know who owns a piece of land, or how many 
have rights in it, or which third party rights take priority over other third party rights.  
This also restates the position already adumbrated or canvassed in this article about 
the multiplicity of interests that may inhere in one land under English common law 
of real property as previously mentioned. 
For example, A is the freeholder of a three – story office building in Lagos. A  
grants a lease of the whole building to B for a term of 99 years.  B in turn grants 
three leases of one floor to each of X, Y and Z.   The leases are each for a term of 10 
years.   The various interests in the building could be represented as follows:  In this 
scenario, A is the freeholder, B is the leaseholder and X, Y, and Z are known as sub-
tenants, or under-tenants.   X, Y and Z are in actual occupation of the property, 
paying rent to B, and B in turn paying rent to A.  Each owner, A, B, X, Y and Z has 
an interest in the property which they will be able to sell albeit not being “the owner” 
of the property.  It is not the intention of this writer to examine leases in this article.  
For the purpose of this article, this writer’s focus is on freeholds. 
Ownership of land under English common law of real property seems to be a mere 
semantic conundrum since a purchaser  of land subject to the tenuous and fatuous 
non-recognition of the concept of ownership of land may for  all practical purposes 
deal with  “his land in the manner he deems fit”.  But the concept is not overly 
whittled down as there are noted limitations besetting an owner of land under 
English law. 
The concept of ownership (of land) has been aptly explained by noted 
Nigerian jurist, Prof. Nwabueze in the following terms: 
                                                
54 Free hold is contrasted with leasehold which is usually of a fixed or determinable duration as the 
only two legal estates in land under English law. 
55 The same piece of land may simultaneously support a free hold, a lease and sub-lease etc. 
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…Ownership is the most comprehensive and complete relation that can exist 
in respect of anything.  It implies the fullest amplitude of rights of 
enjoyment, management and disposal over property.  To put it the other way 
round, it implies that the owner’s title to these rights is superior and 
paramount over any other rights that may exist in land in favour of other 
persons, in negative language his right to the enjoyment, management and 
disposal of the thing must not be dependent upon, or subordinate to that of 
any other person.”56 But it should be noted however, that in the context of 
English law of real property doubt is cast on the appropriateness or 
correctness of the use of the term “maximum” and “absolute” in describing 
the nature of right of an owner more appropriately called the “acquirer” or 
“purchaser” of a real property.  Actually, a purchaser in the context of 
English law of real property does not really purchase land or acquire real 
property, he merely purchases or acquires an interest in land or an estate in 
land the highest of which in Land Law terminology is technically referred to 
as “an estate in fee simple”. 
 
Thus, against the background of Nwabueze’s incisive and illuminating 
observation, it can be gleaned from his opinion that the most visible corollary of the 
abstract and conceptual notion of ownership of land under English law of real 
property is no doubt the right of alienation of such land. It should be noted that 
Nwabueze’s observation is more applicable to Romanic ownership than to Anglo- 
American “estate “or “interest in land” which as previously mentioned can be 
illustrated by a simple metaphor.  This position is aptly illustrated by the Roman 
doctrine of dominium, under which the dominus was entitled to the absolute and 
exclusive right of property in the land.  Nothing less in the way of ownership was 
recognized. For example, A may have either absolute ownership or no ownership at 
all.  Possession was regarded as fundamentally different, and though it was 
adequately protected, the remedies available were personal, not real.57  In contrast, 
English law, in analyzing the relation of the tenant to the land has directed its 
attention not to ownership but to possession (Seisin).58 In relation to the concept of 
seisin, it is noteworthy that under English law, all titles in land are ultimately based 
upon possession in the sense that the title of the man seised prevails against all who 
can show no better right to Seisin. As Burns puts it, “Seisin is a root of title, and it 
may be said without undue exaggeration that in so far as land is concerned there is in 
England no law of ownership, but only a law of possession. 59  
                                                
56 B O Nwabueze, Nigeria land law pg7-8. 
57 Note that for the purposes of determining which kind of entitlements survives a dealing and 
remains binding on a new estate owner or purchaser, English land law draws a conventional 
distinction between ‘’personal’’ and ‘’proprietary’’ right in respect of land. See Gray, Elements of Land 
Law, pp 124-130 
58 See Burns, op cit,29. 
59 Seisin comprised the actual or defacto possession of land quite irrespective of right. Since seisin was 
a matter of fact even the thief could enjoy seisin. The wrongful possessor came to be regarded as 
having a tortious fee simple which he could alienate and devise. At common law the term ‘possession’ 
connotes much more than the idea of a bare physical occupancy.  See J A Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham 
(2003) 1 AC 419 at (70) per Lord Hope of Craighead.)  The relevant emphasis is on the deliberate, 
strategic control of land. Possession is the self evident state of affairs which prevails where one person 
is in a position to ‘control access to {land} by others and in general, decides how it will be 
used.( Western Australia v Ward (2002) 191 ALR 1 at (52) per Glesson CJ, Gaudrn, Gummow and 
Hayne JJ. ). Possession is thus an inherently physical capacity to deal with a thing as we like, to the 
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The writer has endeavored to concentrate on the nature of land ownership 
and the protection of the purchaser in this article. Before dealing with the protection 
of a purchaser in a practical conveyancing context, it is pertinent to add here that 
ownership in legal or juristic sense connotes the entirety or totality or the bundle of 
the rights of the owner over and above every other person on a thing. It connotes a 
complete and total right over a property.60 It is the right to make physical use of a 
thing, the right to the income from it, in money, in kind or in services, and the power 
of management indicating that of alienation.61  
The owner of a property is not subject to the right of another person. He has 
the full and final right of alienation or disposition of the property. He exercises this 
right of alienation or disposition without seeking the consent of another party 
because as a matter of law and fact, no other party’s right over the property is higher 
than his.62 The owner’s right does not have to be exclusive of rights of others, so 
long as these others are not superior to his own. Ownership has, therefore, an 
allodial character.63 It should be noted that, unless the owner of property transfers 
his ownership over the property to a third party, he remains the allodial owner.64 
Similarly, it was the opinion of Main that ownership comprises “a bundle of various 
rights- in this vein the sum total of the principal component rights, that is, right of 
sale…. right to lease, right to charge and right to create easement denotes 
ownership.”65 Suffice it to say that the right of the owner is, therefore, subject to or 
restricted by the superior right of another person.66 Ownership vests in the owner 
the right to possession. 
Dias posits that the right of ownership comprises both benefits and burden:67 
According to the learned author, the former consists of claims, liberties, powers and 
immunities, but the advantages they give are curtailed by duties, liabilities and 
disabilities.68 He further opines that the concept of ownership is needed to give 
effect to the idea of mine”, “not mine” or “thine” 69  E.A Taiwo, in his Nigerian 
Land Law70 maintains that in customary law parlance, ownership is expressed by the 
concept of “absolute” ownership. He further asserts that under English law, as 
received and applied in Nigeria, that term “fee simple” indicates ownership.71 The 
above is somewhat correct; it is opined as an asseveration in that this is the highest 
possible interest one can hold in land under the English law which was received in 
Nigeria and which fundamentally continues to influence our real property 
jurisprudence . Although this is a qualified form of ownership against the 
background that the aforementioned English Law, as received and applied in Nigeria 
does not admit of the concept of ownership unlike the Romanic–Dutch (Civil) Land 
                                                                                                                                
exclusion of everyone else. Thus one may be in possession of land without ever having seen it or 
being aware of its full scope and one may even be in possession of things concealed under the land 
surface without having any reason to suspect their presence or know their location. See also Elwes v 
Briggs Gas Company (1886) 33 Ch D 562 at 568-569  (a case involving a prehistoric long boat) 
60 Tobi, Op Cit, 24-25. 
61 Lawson, Law of Property, p.8 as cited in Nwabueze, Op cit, at  p.7. 
62 Tobi, Op Cit, at 25. 
63 Nwabueze op cit at 8. 
64 Tobi Op cit, at 25. 
65 See Main, Land law in East Africa (Oxford University Press, 1967) 204 – 205. 
66 Utuama, Op cit, 11. 
67 see RWM Dias, Jurisprudence, 5th ed, (1985) 297. 
68 1bid. 
69 1bid. 
70 See E A Taiwo, the Nigerian Land Law, Ababa Press, Ibadan, Nigeria  2011, p.13; 
71 See also Utuama, A A, Nigerian Law of Real Property (Shaneson C I Ltd, Ibadan 1989) 2. 
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Law system72 It is the opinion of this writer that some of these terms are not quite 
correct in the context of Nigerian land law which is hinged on English law as 
received and applied.  This writer is of the firm view that the qualified ownership is 
more appropriately reflected in our conveyancing practice whereby the phrase 
“beneficial” ownership rather than “absolute” ownership is used. It is this interest 
that the vendor/seller is said to convey upon the execution of a valid instrument of 
transfer/disposition as the beneficial owner of an estate in fee simple and the 
purchaser equally becomes, “not the owner of the land”, the subject-matter of the 
disposition/transfer, but the owner of “an estate in fee simple absolute in 
possession”, thus signifying the nature and or quality of interest he acquires thereby.   
Thus, Taiwo writes in his book, The Nigerian Land Law, that these terms are 
sometimes described as the “radical title” and “allodial ownership” and are used 
interchangeably. This writer adds “beneficial ownership” to the classification of the 
nature of ownership in the above mentioned.73 James observed that the adjective 
“absolute” is usually avoided because of various limitations which exist over the 
landowner’s exercise of his dominating right.74 It is submitted that this approach is 
correct and more apposite in dealing with the nature of land ownership in Nigeria as 
under the received and applicable English Law. The term beneficial ownership is 
consistent with James’ perspective on the subject, who, despite his earlier contention 
that the adjective “absolute” is usually avoided because of various limitations which 
exist over the land holder’s exercise of his dominating right – went further to prefer 
the expression “maximal” but concedes that the adjective “absolute” is permissible if 
it is remembered that it denotes the greatest interest in land admitted by customary 
land tenure. 
 
THE PROTECTION OF THE PURCHASER 
It is trite beyond any cavil or peradventure that the security of interest acquired by a 
purchaser is no doubt a corollary of ownership of real property just as possession is 
said to be an incident of ownership and that where ownership of land is in dispute, 
the law presumes the possessor as the owner till the contrary is proved.75 The 
purchaser of an estate in fee simple (freehold estate) or a term of years (leasehold 
estate) is interested in acquiring a valid and indefeasible title or estate together with 
the relevant incorporeal hereditaments or derivative real rights appurtenant or 
pertaining to or benefiting the land. Adverse third party right however, undermines 
this aspiration especially in the context of the unfortunate problems faced in 
unregistered conveyancing. The purchaser and all others take unregistered estates 
subject to such preexisting rights – legal easement, legal lease, legal mortgages, legal 
rights of re-entry etc as these may rear its ugly heads in the form of equitable or legal 
interests which may affect the property as overriding interests. The difficulties posed 
by these interests have not been completely solved even in jurisdictions with 
registered conveyancing system.76  
                                                
72 See Merryman op cit 
73 See Taiwo citing Olawoye, op cit at 1 at p113 
74 72 James   R. W., Modern Land Law of Nigeria, University of Ife Press (1973) 18. 
75 See E A Taiwo, the Nigerian Land Law, Ababa Press, Ibadan, Nigeria  2011, p.16; See also the case 
of Agheghen v Wighareghor (1974) 1 S C 1; See also sec 146, Evidence Act, See also Orhu v Gogo-
Abite (2010) 8 NWLR (pt1196) 307 at 324; Da Costa v Ikomi (1968) 1 All N L R 394.…….. 
76 See Elizabeth Coke, the New Law of Land Registration, Hart Publishing (2003) p.4. 
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As Land has become a tradable commodity with a concomitant demand for easy 
transferability of title,77 the imperative for the protection of the purchaser becomes 
more paramount in contemporary real property law.78 One of the central features of 
contemporary real property law is the way in which it operates to facilitate property 
transactions to protect property interests of third parties against purchasers and to 
protect purchasers.79  
The idea of land as a marketable commodity is so common place today that it 
may be easy to lose sight of the consequences of land alienation for the vendor as 
well as the purchasers. For purchasers of real property, especially in common law 
jurisdictions like the Bahamas, Nigeria; etc. buying property can be a nightmare in 
these jurisdictions that retains old common law unregistered (deeds) conveyancing 
system which poses some problems. Consistent with the preoccupation of a 
materialistic and increasingly affluent age, stability of title has become an ever more 
central focus of social (and therefore legal) concern. There are two practical 
problems here in the context of the foregoing. The first is that deeds may get lost.  
Without them, in the common law; one has to resort to possession as the ancient 
basis of title, which can be proved in a number of ways, none of them especially 
reliable. 
The second problem is that deeds, even a full set of them, may not give a 
whole picture; a prospective purchaser may not be able to ascertain with any degree 
of certainty and clarity from them all the rights affecting land. Deeds registration 
guards against the first problem, but not the second, by setting up a record of deeds, 
so that there is a public record of private paper-work. The advantage of deeds 
registration (unregistered conveyancing system) is that it preserves the system that 
people are used to. Registration adds security and depending upon the precise details 
of the system publicity, which in turn generates a confident market. The main 
disadvantage however, is that it is cumbersome. Individual deeds must still be found 
in the records, there may be a great many to find. Title is not simplified by deeds 
registration; and the production of proof (called by conveyancers “deducing title”) is 
done by tracing ownership from the present day, through the various transactions 
recorded in different deeds, back to a legally acceptable starting point (called in a 
common law system a “root of title”). Thus, one of the important features of deeds 
registration system is its index which will make it more or less easy to find a 
particular document. A further disadvantage is that in land there may exist other 
interests apart from deeds; deed registration has no effect upon such rights and 
cannot make them any more secure or more easily discoverable.80 The vital question 
                                                
77 G Ward and E Kingdom (eds), Land, Custom and Practice in the South Pacific (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1995) 37. There has always been an instinctive bias in favour of 
transactional certainty in the land market. See Royal Bank of Scotland PLC v Etridge (No 2) (2002) 
AC 773 (at 2) per Lord Bingham of Cornhill; and this perceived imperative has now acquired a 
heightened emphasis with the enactment of Land Registration Acts in different parts of the 
progressive jurisdictions of the modern world 
78 By various means this innovative legislations relating to land registration infuse a new quality of 
rationality and pragmatism into dealings with land. 
79 Third party interests in land affect freehold and leasehold estate owners and purchasers alike and 
circumstances in which they can arise are legion. Note that freehold or leasehold estate owners may 
also choose to grant rights to others which do not confer possession, as a leasehold would, but rather 
some lesser form of use of the land. A neighbor might, for example, require a right of access over the 
land; a bank may require a charge on the land to be held as security for a loan. These rights are known 
as “interest in land” and depending on the nature and type of the right they may bind the land and be 
enforceable against subsequent owners (purchasers) of the land. 
80 It should be acutely noted that deeds registration may be merely protective, as in Nigeria and the 
commonwealth of the Bahamas, so that a deed can only have priority over subsequent transactions if 
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then for a prospective purchaser is not “to what burdens is the land subject at the 
moment” rather “to what burdens will it be subject if I buy it”.81 For time and statute 
may have sieving effect in dealing with land in the sense that whatever are or may be 
the burdens on the land at any point, only some will survive and affect a purchaser 
depending on the circumstances of a given transaction. Examples in this regard are 
legion.  A given legislation may be curative and positive in relation to any prior 
defect or burdens affecting land. The operation of equitable principles like bonafide 
purchaser for value without notice may operate in favour of the purchaser who is 
regarded in this context as equity’s darling. And some defects may be wiped away or 
obliterated by effluxion of time. Besides, the general law may also favour the 
purchaser - so that the purchaser will not take the land subject to (or “be bound by”, 
as it is sometimes put) by such burdens.82  
Suffice it to say that the purchaser also knows from the general law, that he 
will not be subject to any trust interests, in the land that are overreached by the 
disposition to him. Overreaching is the process by which the beneficial or equitable 
interest of a trustee or co-owner is killed off and transferred into the proceeds of sale 
in the hands of the seller. The most common way to overreach the beneficial interest 
of such a co-owner is by appointment of a second trustee.83 Thus, if for example one 
buys unregistered land now, and an estate contract was registered against a purchaser 
in 1930, the title deduced to the person will probably contain no evidence of that 
1930 owner and the person will never actually find the registration. That does not 
matter because doubtless the contract is long defunct.84 Registration under the 
English Land Charges Act 1972 and Law of Property Act 1925 constitute actual 
notice to the entire world, so that a purchaser is bound by all land charges, even if he 
would not otherwise have been bound because they are equitable and he had no 
notice of them.85  Moreover, interest which can be registered as land charges must be 
so registered or be void against (broadly) most purchasers.  The rule is strict; an 
unregistered land charge is void even if the purchaser knew about it, indeed even if 
the purpose of the conveyance was to defeat the interest.86 
It should be noted that in practical conveyancing, the prospective purchasers 
of land will want to know whether any third party rights exist over that land, and if 
                                                                                                                                
it is registered, or in some cases it may also be dispositive as in Scotland and other civil law 
jurisdictions (Scotland actually practices mixed system) so that it is of no effect at all unless registered. 
See the Sasine Deeds Act of 1611 (Scotland); Land Registration(Scotland) Act 1979 
81 The distinction between proprietary and non-proprietary rights in land is quite apposite here. As 
previously adumbrated, for the purposes of determining which kinds of entitlement survive a dealing 
and remain binding on a new estate owner, English land law draws a conventional distinction between 
‘personal’ and ‘proprietary’ rights in respect of land. Only those rights which are classified as 
proprietary have the potential to bind a purchaser of the land; personal right can never do so, 
although they may sometimes retain a limited enforceability (usually by way of a remedy in damages) 
against their grantor, the former owner of the estate now transferred. 
82 See p.70 of Cooke. 
83 See the case of City of London building society v Flegg (1987) 3 All ER 435; William and Glyn’s 
Bank ltd v Boland (1981) AC 487; National Provincial Bank ltd v Ainsworth (1965) AC 1175 @ 
1247G- 1248A. Overreaching is the process whereby equitable interests under a trust becomes 
detached from the land and transferred to the money paid by the buyer, thus enabling a buyer of a 
legal estate to take the land free from those interests. In other for the interest to be overreached, the 
purchase price must be paid to at least two trustees being not less than two in number (or to a trust 
corporation). If so, the interest of the beneficiary will not bind a buyer even one with notice. 
84 But note that a restrictive covenant might not be, and it is easy to see how a purchaser could be 
caught by pre-root encumbrances. 
85 See LPA 1925 section 198. 
86 See the case Midland Bank Trust co. Ltd v Green (1981) AC 513 
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they do, whether they will be enforceable against him/her as they are against the 
current owner. Likewise the holder of such a right over the estate needs to know 
whether or not that right will survive a sale of the estate to become enforceable 
against the new owner, as they are against the current owner. However, it is against 
the background that although the doctrine of privity of contract would suggest that 
rights can only bind the original parties, however because an “interest in land is a 
proprietary right, it is capable of being enforceable against successors in title to the 
party who originally created it. For example Caroline and Dorothy enter into a 
contract allowing Dorothy to have a right of way over Caroline’s land.  In this 
scenario, there exists a privity of contract between Caroline and Dorothy.  In this 
situation, there is said to be a privity of contract between Caroline and Dorothy. This 
means that both of them are entitled to sue upon the terms of the contract, for 
example, the buyer of Caroline’s land will depend upon the nature of the right and 
whether it has been  registered.  As a general rule, legal interests bind the whole 
world without the need for registration, but equitable interests, such as restrictive 
covenant, must be registered in order to be enforceable by or against successor in 
title.  However, conveyancers must appreciate the need to timeously register interests 
that require such registration for their legal efficacy.  In spite of the above, 
purchasers may still be affected  by certain kinds of interest  known as overriding  
interests .These are interests that bind  a buyer/ purchaser even though  they do not  
appear anywhere on the register. Overriding interest include legal lease granted for a 
term not exceeding 7years.87 It is considered that any purchaser of the property will 
be aware of lease by virtue of the occupation of the property by the tenant. 
Legal easements acquired by implied grant are also included in this category of 
rights that can override a registered disposition. In this respect, it should be acutely 
noted that easements, which are right over the land such as rights of way, do not 
need to be created by deed in some circumstances,  and may be acquired  by 
implication , for example as a result of use over time.88 Any interest that is held by a 
person in occupation equally belongs to the category of rights under reference.  
However in the above context, such an interest will not be overriding if either: 
1. It is not disclosed on reasonable inquiry, or  
2. It belongs to a person whose occupation would not have been obvious on a 
reasonable inspection of the land.  
                                                
87 Such leases do not have their own registered leasehold title. there will only be a registered title in 
respect of freehold estate. nor do they appear anywhere on the freehold register. By virtue of schedule 
3 paragraph 1 of LRA 2002 these leases override the register. They are an example of an ‘unregistered 
interest dispositions’. This means that any buyer of the freehold will be bound by the lessee’s less than 
seven year lease even though it is not registered. 
88 See s.62 law of property act 1925 with respect to implied grant. In relation to presumed grant 
(prescription), if there is no express or implied easement, then the third way (apart from express or 
implied grant) in which an easement may be created is by way of presumption after use for a 
sufficiently long period of time. Such easements are always legal as the presumption is made by the 
common law. They are frequently called easement by prescription. See the Prescription Act 1832. 
Note that in every case, the use must be of right neither by force, by stealth, nor by permission. Note 
further that an easement by presumed grant can only be claimed for the benefit of a freeholder against 
another freeholder who knows of the use and his able to resist it. Thus, tenant cannot claim an 
easement by prescription against their landlord (with the exception of a right to land), and one tenant 
cannot claim right against another tenant of the same landlord although they may on behalf of their 
landlord obtain a right by prescription against another freeholder.  
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Such an interest is binding to the extent that it relates to land that is actually 
occupied.  The question then becomes opposite:  how then are occupier’s interests 
dealt with so that the buyer/purchaser takes free of them?  It is also in practical 
conveyancing context possible to add a special condition   (while drafting the 
contract) to the contract dealing with any occupiers at the property.  In this regard it 
is common for the buyer to raise a pre- contract enquiry asking the seller to confirm 
whether there are any occupiers (apart from seller) and if there are, whether they may   
have a beneficial interest in  the property  and whether  they will agree to  vacate  the 
property on or before  completion of the transaction. This underscores the 
importance of the need to make actual inspection of the property where this is 
reasonably possible by the purchaser/buyer before concluding the transaction.   If 
there    are occupiers, the buyer should insist that the seller should provide for a 
special condition or clause to be inserted in the contract confirming that the occupier 
has no interest in the property, and that the occupier agrees to vacate on completion.  
The occupier must then sign the contract to give effect to this proviso, and should 
obtain independent legal advice prior to signing that they understand the nature and 
effect of the proviso. 
 
CONCLUSION  
Having examined the nature of land ownership, the need for the protection 
of the purchaser can hardly be over emphasized.  As land becomes   a tradable 
commodity with a concomitant demand for easy transferability of title, it is 
imperative that the means or the process by which lands are bought and sold be 
made less cumbersome, more safe and secure and less- time consuming.   Our 
current old-common law deeds conveyances (unregistered) system has become 
anachronistic and should be jettisoned and replaced with the globalizing trend of title 
registration which facilitates conveyancing and  affords guarantee  to title being 
acquired by purchasers .  There ought to be bold and pragmatic initiatives to 
introduce the Torrens system of land registration in the Bahamas and the federation 
of Nigeria and to establish a mechanism of ownership by way of Cadastral survey 
and registration of title to land. A statutory legislation is urgently needed in this 
regard in the two identified common law jurisdictions.  Accordingly such legislation 
will seek to create and oversee an intensified system of almost universal recordation 
of property rights in Nigeria and the Commonwealth of the Bahamas in their 
respective Land Registers, thereby sharpening up the effects of dealings between 
strangers and reducing potential threats to any title taken by a transferee or 
mortgagee (purchaser). Accordingly such a system of land registration affords 
purchasers of real estate what in some jurisdiction is often referred to as indefeasible 
title.89 The benefits inherent in a system of land registration are indeed legion.  
Land registration reduces the transaction cost of property by providing 
publicity for interest in land, authoritative title information and clear priority rules to 
                                                
89 The more appropriate term ‘guaranteed’ title is preferred to ‘indefeasible’ title. Although an 
‘absolute title’ to land is the most secure form of title recognized under most land registration 
legislations, it is nevertheless an inherent feature of most of the Acts e.g. the English Land 
Registration Act 2002 that no registered title is ultimately unalterable or indefeasible. Although it is 
critical to keep to a minimum the number of matters which may defeat the title of a registered 
proprietor, it remains the case that, regardless of the class of title to an applicant for first registration 
under the system, no register of title is ever bullet-proof. Even absolute titles are liable to be altered in 
certain kinds of circumstances. In this regard, one can say that the register is vulnerable to rectification 
in certain circumstances. 
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co-ordinate competing rights.90 It is true that every purchaser of a real estate will 
want a title that is not vulnerable to effective advance challenge. Land registration 
provides purchaser such a title in the sense that in the rare unlikely circumstances 
where the purchaser’s title is effectively challenged, the land register is vulnerable to 
rectification and the purchaser entitled to the land he purchased or at the very least 
to compensation commonly referred to as indemnity owing to the fact that in such a 
system of land registration, the acquisition of title enjoys state guarantee in the title 
so acquired by a purchaser.91 The plain fact here in the opinion of this writer is that 
such a system is much better than our current system of deeds recordation which is 
susceptible to fraud, transactional failure and a demonstrable lack of clarity in title 
albeit uncertainty in security of title being acquired by prospective purchasers.  The 
system of registration checkmates fraud and transactional failures and protects 
purchasers against unknown adverse interest.  
One of the aims of registration is to make title more secure and easily 
provable.  It is supposed, ideally, to set up a mirror of ownership.  The minor 
principle or, rather aspiration is hostile to interests that do not appear on the 
registered title. Such a system commends itself to jurisdictions that continue to 
practice common law deeds conveyancing system like Nigerian and the Bahamas. 
The system in Nigeria under which government administers land through grants of 
right of occupancy, issuance of certificate of occupancy and endorsement of consent 
on instruments of transfer of interests in land is a recipe for fraud, political patronage 
and fatuous   bureaucratic chicanery on the part of the government against the 
governed which in addition to other drawbacks causes unnecessary difficulty, 
confusion and muddy the much sought after clarity of land ownership.92    Like many 
systems, registration has its own momentum; it tends towards tidiness and   
completeness and to the elimination, as far as possible of interests that a purchaser 
cannot discover from the register.    Besides, registration seems to imply a unitary 
form of ownership, in much that the same way that registration of ownership of 
shares, cars, ships or dogs is supposed to enable one to point to the owners.93 One of 
the fundamental difficulties with registration in a common law system is what are we 
to do with equitable interests?   Are they to be eliminated or registered or 
enforceable despite being unregistered? It should be appreciated that most systems 
of land registration, whether the English or Australian system (the torrens system) 
are beset or faced with this perplexing problem in relation to overriding interests, the 
draconian effect of which was exemplified by the noted case of William and Glyn 
Bank limited v Boland which rocked the English conveyancing community to its 
very foundation. Against this background, there are certain rights and interests that 
                                                
90 The publicity principle as found in some jurisdictions like Scotland and other systems with Roman-
Dutch heritage is similar to Anglo-American doctrine of notice found in common law jurisdictions 
like the Bahamas and Nigeria. See Law of Property Act 1925, section 198 on the doctrine of notice 
even in the context of unregistered conveyancing. 
91 It is integral to the indemnity principle of title registration or what is sometimes referred to as the 
insurance principle underlying title registration that any person who innocently suffers loss by reason 
of the operation of the Land Register should receive compensation. Thus most land registration 
systems make provision for the payment of indemnity in certain qualified circumstances. See the 
recent English Land Registration Act 2002, section 103. 
92 Our present conveyancing practice is redolent of anachronistic and archaic conceptions and 
practices 
93 The simplifying force of registration is thoroughly demonstrated in Alan Pottage’s work. See The 
Originality of Registration, (1995)  15 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 37,   and ‘Evidencing 
Ownership’  in Bright and J  Dewar (eds)  Land Law,  Themes  and Perspective   (Oxford), OUP, 
1998/129. 
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surely demand protection albeit being incapable of registration e.g., the right of a 
spouse in occupation of a matrimonial home, the right of a person with a short term 
lease, right of every person in occupation of land, etc.94 The ideal situation would 
have been for all these rights to be entered in the register so that the land register can 
surely be a mirror of interest in land. Overriding interests however, undermines this 
aspiration as a crack in the mirror.95 It is suggested that prospective purchasers or 
their legal representatives should inspect the subject property and make necessary 
enquiries of any of such rights capable of overriding a given disposition. Perhaps, a 
further assurance or a warrandice as in Scots law may be obtained from the 
prospective seller undertaking that no such right to his knowledge is in existence or 
floating over the subject property.96  . 
It is highly desirable of (in) a modern society where individuals own and 
trade land as a capital asset that their ownership (be) not only easily proved and 
efficiently transferred but also safe, secure, indefeasible or guaranteed in the hands of 
purchasers.97 This will inspire confidence in the real property sector / market and 
which will in turn boast investment in this vital sector of the economy.  It is the 
opinion of this writer that a system of land registration is a means of achieving this 
end in Nigeria and in other common law jurisdictions like the Bahamas etc. that 




                                                
94 see Celesteel ltd v Alton House Holding ltd (1985) 1 WLR 204 and English LRA 1925, s70(1 
95 The mirror principle means that the register reflects the state of the title and there is also the curtain 
principle which is to the effect that the register is the sole source of information for proposing 
purchasers, who need not and, indeed, must not concern themselves with trust and equities which lie 
behind the curtain. See “an English man looks at the Torrens system” (Sydney, Law Book Company, 
1957), 8 ff. 
96 Note not all rights are registrable but the register is the complete record of those which are 
97 The term indefeasible as commonly used in the Australian jurisdiction is somewhat incorrect. The 
ideal term should be “guaranteed’” as no title is in actuality indefeasible and the register may be 
vulnerable to rectification. Thus the term guaranteed is preferably to indefeasible. 
